Chapter Six

The Nuclear Tests

Between October 3, 1952 and October 9, 1957 Britain tested 12 nuclear devices in a program known collectively as the ‘major trials’. The tests were carried out using a variety of methods of delivery, being supported on a tower in eight cases and dropped from an aircraft, tethered from a balloon, exploded on the ground and exploded inside a moored British naval frigate in each of the four remaining tests. These atomic tests were held at Monte Bello off the Western Australian coast, and Emu Field and Maralinga in South Australia, under the series code names of Hurricane, Totem, Mosaic, Buffalo and Antler. Britain’s thermonuclear tests, the Grapple series consisting of nine tests, were held at the Malden and Christmas Islands in the Pacific from May 15, 1957 to September 23, 1958 (Australian Department of Defence 1984).

A series of trials called ‘minor trials’ were performed at Emu and Maralinga between the years 1955 and 1963. The earlier trials of the series code-named Kittens, Tims, Rats and Vixen A tested nuclear weapon components and potential accident contamination. The last of the series Vixen B which was non-nuclear and used conventional explosives, was designed to investigate the behaviour of the components of a nuclear device by the simulation of the type of conditions that might cause a nuclear weapon to explode in an accident eg a fire, explosion. As will be described later, it was these series of tests particularly the Vixen A and Vixen B, that was to produce the most formidable form of radioactive pollution at Maralinga, which unfortunately exists to this day (Australian Radiation Laboratory 1997).

Following the Bermuda conference between British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and American President Dwight Eisenhower in March 1957 and described in Chapter 4 (see p. 26), the British cooperated with the Americans in twenty-eight joint US-UK tests at the Nellis Air Force Range Test Site (Nevada). Since they are not part of the British atomic tests being considered by this thesis, these tests will be given no further consideration. (British Nuclear Testing 1997).

Throughout this chapter reference will be made to “the Tests Authority” and the “Safety Committee”. The organisations being referred to are the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) responsible for carrying out the tests, and the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee (AWTSC), an Australian body, which was responsible for tests safety.

This chapter will include the relevant facts relating to the major and minor trials – information that enables the reader to appreciate the fallout and pollution resulting from them. Discussed will be the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee (AWTSC) and the Committee’s response to accusations of proven incidences of fallout on populated areas. To enable the reader to appreciate these topics, a section on the theory of nuclear explosions and the mechanism of fallout is included. The chapter will consider:

· The theory of nuclear explosions and the mechanism of fallout.

· Fallout produced by the tests.

· The major trials.

· Documented Accounts of Fallout

· The Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee (AWTSC)

· The minor trials.

The Theory of Nuclear Explosions and the Mechanism of Fallout.

The discovery by Hahn and Strassmann of nuclear fission in 1940, and a scientific paper by Frisch, and Peierls introducing the concept of a critical mass, and suggesting that making an atomic bomb was possible using a quantity of approximately five kilograms of U-235 (ie a large enough quantity of the material in which internally expelled neutrons had a high probability of striking an atom and causing fission before reaching the surface) was a major step in the development of nuclear weapons. Although enormous engineering problems still existed, for example, the production of plutonium Pu-239 and that of extracting the rare fissionable isotope U-235 from the non-fissionable U-238, the problem of designing an atomic bomb now became one of how to instantly create a supercritical mass of Pu-239 or U-235 from many subcritical pieces of the same material. As each of the “pieces” would be subcritical and would remain so until assembled as part of a supercritical mass, the weapon could be safely stored since it would, apart from producing relatively small amounts of radiation due to the decay of its U-235 or Pu-239 core, only become active when the core was driven to became supercritical.

Using conventional explosives to blast the pieces of the nuclear core together to form a supercritical mass, solved the problem, however the explosion process had to be very precisely timed to bring all the pieces together at the same instant, otherwise only partial fission would result. In addition, research developed artificial sources of intense neutron radiation and found means of reflecting neutrons back into the fissioning core, both of these in order to increase the yield of the device. Hence the purpose of nuclear testing was not only to perfect the explosive trigger, but to test various means of increasing the quantity of neutrons promoting fission and thus increasing to a larger percentage, the usually very small fraction of the core which contributes energy to the nuclear explosion. Miniaturisation of the device was another reason.

The Fission Bomb

When atoms of either Uranium-235 or Plutonium-239 absorb an extra neutron, the affected atom becomes unstable and divides into two or more pieces, at the same time releasing radiation in the form of alpha and beta particles, gamma radiation and of course neutrons. This process is called fission where the expelled neutrons can be absorbed by other atoms to further the process. However, if the masses of all the expelled fragments are added together, they are found to collectively weigh less than the original intact atom. This difference in mass is attributed to the “binding energy” which held the atom together and whose quantity is given by Einstein’s famous equation E = M C2, where E is the binding energy, M is the mass difference and C is the velocity of light where C = 300,000,000 m/s. Calculations show the binding energy, because of the C2 factor, is extremely large, which explains the enormous power of an atomic explosion (Ference et al 1954, p. 593).

Existing atomic bomb technology at the time that Britain commenced her test program consisted of two basic types – the Uranium gun barrel type used in the Hiroshima bomb and the more complex Plutonium implosion type bomb that was used at Nagasaki, where Plutonium could not be adapted to the simpler gun barrel type because of inherent impurity problems. Because Plutonium is manufactured in nuclear reactors and is more plentiful than U-235, which is only present in small quantities as an impurity in U-238 and needs to be separated using the costly gas-fusion process, most atomic bombs tested by the British were of the implosion type.

As to the two systems, the gun barrel system was simply a tube at one end of which was a portion of U-235 which was hollowed where the tube entered it. At the tube’s other end, a smaller piece of U-235 of a size that would fit into the hollow was supported inside the tube. Since each piece was smaller than a critical mass but supercritical when combined, the device was triggered when the smaller portion was fired down the barrel into the hollow of the larger piece. In the implosion system, many portions of subcritical Pu-239 were arranged on the surface of an imaginary sphere each backed by an explosive charge and pointing towards the sphere’s centre. The nuclear explosion was initiated when the charges blasted the pieces in unison towards the centre (Falk 1983, pp. 180-183).

Fusion or Thermonuclear Bombs

Whereas fission is associated with elements on heavy end of the periodic table, fusion is linked to the isotopes of hydrogen - deuterium and tritium, ie with the atoms at the lighter end of the table. While fission relies on splitting larger atoms into smaller ones, fusion combines quantities of deuterium and tritium to form helium, where the helium atom produced has a smaller mass than the deuterium-tritium combination that produced it. Because the difference in mass for a fusion reaction is almost three times greater than a Pu-239 or U-235 fission reaction, the fusion bomb is at least that number of times more powerful than a fission one.

However, since a fusion reaction will only occur when the temperature of the deuterium-tritium combination is in of the order of tens of millions degrees Centigrade, a fission device is used to provide the high temperatures necessary to trigger the reaction. The purpose of hydrogen bomb tests is to improve the trigger operation, to test for improved deuterium-tritium combinations and also to find better shielding materials.

Nuclear Explosions and Fallout

The explosion of a one-megaton nuclear bomb produces in an instant, a fireball of 100 metres in diameter, which after ten seconds will have grown to be two kilometres wide. Initially the fireball, while it resides at a temperature of several million degrees Celsius, is a source of intense ionising and thermal radiation where the ionising radiation consists of alpha, beta, gamma and neutron radiation that has been previously discussed. Almost one third of the fireball’s energy is radiated as thermal radiation. This thermal pulse, which for a one megaton bomb has a duration of ten seconds, is able to melt metal structures within a five kilometre radius, set fire to any inflammable objects up to ten kilometres distant and cause significant burning and scorching at twenty kilometres. Further, an enormous pressure wave caused by the expanding fireball moves out for the point of detonation at slightly higher than the velocity of sound, flattening all structures within a five kilometres radius, destroying most lighter structures up to ten kilometres and causing from light to significant damage to light structures at twenty kilometres. This shock wave has the added effect of fanning the flames of any burning objects to a sufficient intensity that a firestorm is the most likely result. Both Hiroshima and to a lesser extent Nagasaki experienced firestorms after the atomic bombings (Falk 1983, pp. 8-16).

Longer term effects of a nuclear explosion result from fallout. Any material close to the point of a nuclear explosion, including bomb materials, building structures, soil and other objects are vaporised by the intense heat to form a gas, particularly with ground bursts where the fireball expands to make contact with the ground. As the fireball expands and cools it rises similarly to a hot-air balloon, taking with it in addition to the vaporised materials, any residue of the surroundings including ash and dust particles which are light enough to be drawn into the rising cloud, then being mixed with radioactive by-products of the bomb and themselves becoming radioactive. Absorption of neutrons also causes otherwise non-radioactive substances to become radioactive (Royal Commission, Vol 1 1985, pp. 25-26).

As the cooling fireball rises to become a cloud it acquires a stem – a tail of super-heated dust and other debris which is dragged up behind it. The stem soon dislocates from the ground and becomes part of the typical mushroom-shaped atomic bomb cloud – a dome consisting of the cooled original fireball trailing a ragged tail, the whole complex being distorted by the winds as it climbs ever higher. By this time fallout has for long been occurring, starting with the cooling of the fireball when the heavy vaporised materials solidify and are scattered near the site of the explosion and continuing with lighter substances along the track of the cloud, some precipitating out as “black rain” – rain laden with ash and other fallout materials. When the atomic cloud acquires the density of the surrounding air, it ceases to rise and is then subject to the wind patterns and rain activity which will decide where the intensely radioactive materials still in the cloud finally come to rest. An airburst by contrast produces considerably less fallout since only relatively small amounts of ground materials are drawn up into the cloud (Royal Commission, Vol 1 1985, pp. 25-26).

The Major Trials.

Operation Hurricane

This first test of the British test series took place off Trimouille Island near Monte Bello Island on October 3, 1952. Its purpose was to test the effects of exploding a ship-smuggled nuclear bomb on a harbour and surrounding areas. The bomb was exploded inside the hull of the British naval frigate HMS Plym that was anchored in 40 feet of water. The subsequent blast left a saucer shaped seabed crater 20 feet deep and 1,000 feet in diameter, where the explosive power of this implosion device was estimated at 25 Kilo Tons (British Nuclear Testing 1997, p. 2).

Operation Totem

The Totem series was intended to add to the general knowledge of atomic weapon technology (British Nuclear Testing 1997, pp. 3-4). In addition however, the series was an experiment to ascertain how much non-fissionable Plutonium-240 could be tolerated in a Plutonium-239 core without reducing the bomb’s effectiveness. This was because Britain’s nuclear power stations were not producing plutonium fast enough to satisfy needs (the British Chiefs of Staff wanted 200 A-bombs by 1957) hence the question arose as to how high a Plutonium-240 content was tolerable.

Name Location Date Yield Method of Delivery
Totem 1 Emu Field 3/10/53 10 Kt 31 m high tower

Totem 2 Emu Field 26/10/53 8 Kt 31 m high tower

(British Nuclear Testing 1997, pp. 12-13).

Operation Mosaic

The primary purpose of the series was to conduct research in support of thermonuclear weapon development (British Nuclear Testing 1997, pp. 4-5).The G2 test was to produce the largest yield of any atomic device conducted in Australia and exceeded an assurance of yield limit given by the British Government to Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies, by an excess of 30 Kt.

Operation Buffalo

This was the first test series carried out at Maralinga (Aboriginal for “Field of Thunder”) on the Great Victoria Desert in South Australia. The role of the first test of the series was to help develop the Red Beard tactical nuclear bomb that had an expected yield of 16 Kt. The Red Beard tactical bomb was a plutonium implosion device (British Nuclear Testing 1997, pp. 5-6).

Operation Antler

Round 2 was referred to as a lightweight plutonium device (ie similar to the Nagasaki bomb) which was to lead to the development of a miniaturised warhead for the Bloodhound surface-to-air missile. All were implosion devices. Worrying however was the discovery after the Tadje test of many small pieces of highly radioactive cobalt, later shown to be cobalt 60, found lying on the test site (Milliken 1986, pp. 228-229). Cobalt 60 was, because of its ability to become highly radioactive after being irradiated, a component of the hopefully now defunct cobalt bomb. Milliken asserts that the AWTSC headed by Titterton concealed this purpose of Round 1 from the Australian Government (Milliken 1986, p. 228).

Operation Grapple

This series of nine tests formed the test program to develop the British hydrogen bomb. With a yield of only 200-300 Kt of an expected yield of one Mt, the first test of the series, Grapple 1/Short Granite was regarded as being only partially successful. However, the later tests Round C, Grapple Y and Grapple Z (Flagpole 1 and Halliard 1) were regarded as completely successful with yields of 1.8, 2 and 2.5-3 Mt respectively.

In all cases the fission trigger was a plutonium implosion device. At the completion of these tests Britain was able to claim the status of a “Nuclear Power” and a program of cooperation with the United States was soon to follow.

Documented Accounts of Fallout

A one-page item published in the Adelaide Advertiser in May 16, 1956 quotes Professor E W Titterton as saying,

An Australian Safety Committee comprised of six University and Defence scientists has the hazard problem under continuous review and is responsible for choosing firing times so that the weather conditions are favourable and no damage to life and property can result either on the mainland, to ships at sea, or to aircraft which obey the instructions relating to restricted areas.

As a member of the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee to which he is referring Titterton was attempting to allay possible public fears of the forthcoming Buffalo atomic tests to be held at Maralinga.

However an article written in the same newspaper almost twenty-four years later, (English & Ionno 1980) tells how Adelaide City experienced widespread radioactive fallout with measured radiation levels of 900 times background radiation, resulting from a secondary plume of radiation which had drifted South from Buffalo Round 3, exploded the previous day. There is no indication that authorities in Adelaide were warned of the potential danger, which could have effected the city’s 518,000 inhabitants. The authors do however play down possible effects of the city’s fallout since they write “the levels were very low in human effect terms”, and they dispute that any health effects Adelaide’s 1956 population has occurred by declaring,

Figures from the Australian Bureau of Statistics on cancer deaths in SA between 1945-49 and 1970-74 show no clear increase that can be directly attributed to fall-out over Adelaide in 1956.

Where the Bureau’s study found increases in cancer over the relevant period of 1970-74 when the effects due to radioactive fallout would be discernible, were attributable to other causes ie smoking and pollution.

But were the Bureau’s findings valid? Surely the study is only relevant to the 518,000 inhabitants of Adelaide on the night of 11-12 of October 1956 and no others. But the late-fifties heralded significant changes to Adelaide’s population. Then there were large influxes from overseas – the European and British migration scheme was in full swing, and from within Australia of workers and their families attracted by the work opportunities offered by the new industries being established by the Playford Government. So that there would have been many new arrivals to dilute Adelaide’s population of the night of 11-12 of October!

The use by the Australian Bureau of Statistics of death certificates of the means of determining the cause of death, if this indeed was the source of the data, is flawed since Roff (1997) sees studies based on death certificate data as “underestimating the specific causes of mortality”. She cites a study (Ron et al 1994) based on 5000 necropsies (autopsies) which examined death certificate accuracy in twelve categories of disease where the actual cause was later determined by autopsy. The results showed the overall agreement between certificate and autopsy to be only 52.5% where almost 25% of cancers diagnosed at autopsy were missed on death certificates (see p. 104).

However the statement by the article’s authors that “the levels were very low in human effect terms” down plays the possible harm since even in 1980 a number of medical experts believed that small doses of radiation were harmful and now, the proponents of the “no dose too small” theory is overwhelming (see p. 51) (English & Ionno 1980).

In an article published in the National Times on May 4, 1980, Smith and Snow (1980) claim that resulting from the atomic tests during 1956, there was widespread radioactive contamination from fallout over the Australian mainland. The authors further maintain that reports issued to the media by the AWTSC were in conflict with the findings of a CSIRO team headed by biologist Dr Hedley Marston using biological monitoring of grazing animals to determine and measure fallout. The nature of what was to become the bitter conflict between Marston and the safety committee will be discussed in a later section dealing with the AWTSC. It is only the extent to which the CSIRO team could prove that publicity releases emanating from the AWTSC were incorrect, that is important here.

Discord between Marston’s findings and AWTSC publicity statements first appeared in July 1956 after the Mosaic tests that had been held in May and June. Where press releases by the Safety Committee had stressed that there could be no danger to mainland Australia from fallout from the two tests, the CSIRO team found that “effects of the explosions could be detected in animals grazing within a band of terrain about 1,000 miles wide stretching west to east across the continent”. According to Marston, “Some of the areas most heavily contaminated with fallout from the plumes were 1,500-2,000 miles away from the weapon test site on the North-Eastern seaboard and central Western Queensland”.

In Rockhampton, the team found evidence which seriously questioned the AWTSC’s assertions, in that the levels of radioactivity for the Mosaic tests were found the be one hundred-fold greater than the level produced by the Hurricane test where there was an overall 3000-fold increase in pre-test radioactive levels. Other central Queensland towns similarly affected were Townsville, Mt Isa, Charlesville and Longreach. Rockhampton and Townsville at the time both had populations that exceeded 40,000. Biological monitoring by Marston’s team during the later Maralinga tests, again detected radioactive fallout on these same Queensland areas, and on October 12, radioactive fallout on Adelaide due to the third Buffalo test and discussed previously, was also detected. (Smith and Snow 1980)

Throughout the 1956 tests period as on other occasions, AWTSC members particularly Martin and Titterton stressed that the tests posed no threat to public and environmental safety. However when testifying at the Royal Commission in 1985, Titterton said,

No-one on the [safety] committee was apprehensive about the fallout. They were apprehensive about the behaviour of the media and certain people with political objectives using the media in whatever way they could, even by misinformation, to stir up public opinion against the trials. That is what they were apprehensive about. (Milliken 1986, p. 82)

The Black Mist Investigation

Relevant to the present discussion of fallout, the Black Mist incident is also an event of great importance to this thesis, since it betrays the careless attitude of the Test Authority to the safety of Aborigines which is pertinent the issue of the Test Authority’s attitude of racism and human rights abuse towards them. This section discusses the scientific evidence which established that the Black Mist could have occurred.

Responding to allegations regarding the Black Mist that appeared in the British Observer on April 3, 1983, the Deputy Director of the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE), Dr F Morgan wrote to the Director-General of the Meteorological Office asking whether in the light of the Observer’s claims, the phenomenon could have occurred. The Meteorological Office suggested the possibilities that (Royal Commission, Vol 1 1985, p. 179),

(a) test debris may have been carried so far over the ground by low level winds or

(b) debris at higher levels falling out at the locations reporting the Black Mist.

To test the possibilities that a black mist could have resulted from fallout from Totem 1,

Dr W T Roach of the UK Meteorological Office and Mr D G Vallis of AWRE, constructed a computer model in which the following conditions would be accepted

(Royal Commission, Vol 1 1985, p. 179),

(a) the rising convective boundary layer can reach 1500 metres by mid-afternoon and entrain descending particles;

(b) wind movements were generally south-west, light at the surface and increasing gradually with height;

(c) there was little wind shear;

(d) the cloud preserved itself as a visible entity for at least 24 hours.

As to the atomic cloud of Totem 1 it was assumed that (Royal Commission, Vol 1 1985, p. 180),

(a) the main cloud was a sphere 2.6 Km in diameter with its base at 2.2 Km altitude;

(b) eighty-five percent of the total mass was in the main cloud, the rest being in the stem and,

(c) the wind speed at the top of the convective boundary layer where debris was being entrained was moving only a little faster than the mean wind speed in the convective boundary layer below.

To facilitate the mathematical modelling, the stem of the cloud was divided into horizontal slices of equal thickness, each containing a particular load density of particles of a size distribution recommended according to AWRE estimates. It was assumed that particles migrated downward between slices according to the influence of gravity and air resistance, the terminal velocity being determined by particle size and density.

The Findings of the Model

In their findings Roach and Vallis claimed that the model confirmed there would have been local concentrations of fallout in areas over which the atomic cloud had passed and that “They were probably limited in horizontal extents (say 1-3 Km) but large enough to have been noticeable as local visibility reductions – perhaps as the reported ‘Black Mist’” adding that the cloud ”would have stretched from horizon to horizon near the centre” and that “It would have been a strange and awesome sight to anyone beneath it. A fine ‘drizzle’ of black particles would also have been noticed”

They ended by saying that according to the predictions of the model “it is a possibility that there may have been a visible phenomenon in the Wallatinna and Welbourne Hill area on the 15 October 1953 that might have had an appearance similar to that described by the Aboriginals …” (Royal Commission, Vol 1 1985, p. 181). The British MOD in turn argued that finding a ground mist due to Totem 1 at a distance of 173 Km NE of the test site was an impossibility, therefore assuming, it would seem, that the “Rolling Black Mist” could not have occurred (Royal Commission, Vol 1 1985, p. 177).

However the informal inquiry as to the legitimacy of the Black Mist continued. On September 18, 1980, several months after the Advertiser article, the Australian Federal Government queried the Australian Ionising Radiation Advisory Council (AIRAC) on the general question of public safety and more particularly, the question of the possible existence of the Black Mist. In reply to the former AIRAC concluded:

The precautions taken to ensure that Aborigines living in the area were not endangered by the nuclear tests were carefully planned and executed, and AIRAC has found no evidence that any Aborigines were injured during the tests.

As to the Black Mist however AIRAC did concede that:

AIRAC also reached the conclusion that, given the prevailing meteorological conditions, blast yields and distances from all the tests at Emu and Maralinga, such an observed phenomenon at Wallatinna could have been related only to the Totem 1 test at Emu.

An interesting tête-à-tête occurred at the Royal Commission hearing between counsel assisting the Royal Commission Peter McClellan, and Professor Titterton regarding the latter’s disclosure of sensitive information to other members of the Safety committee: (Milliken 1986, p. 85)

McClellan: Were you always careful to tell them everything you knew?

Titterton: You are near to being libellous now ...

McClellan: Perhaps I am Sir Ernest, but would you deal with the question that you always disclosed everything you knew to your colleagues on the Safety Committee?

Titterton: Of course not, I was subject to American control on information .. I was subject to the Official Secrets Act ...

The Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee (AWTSC)

Originally called the Maralinga Safety Committee formed on July 21, 1955 under the chair of Professor L H Martin of Melbourne University, the Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee was given its final name on March 28 1957 under the leadership of Professor Ernest Titterton. The English-born Titterton who in the pre-war years had worked as an assistant to Oliphant in Birmingham, and later during the war on the Manhattan Project, had migrated to Australia on Oliphant’s request to take up a post at ANU.

Described in the Report to the Royal Commission as having displayed “a cavalier treatment of the truth” (Vol. 1, p. 17), he was seen by many as a vain and arrogant man who thought of those opposed to nuclear power as “long-haired sandal-footed do-gooders” (Tame & Robotham 1982, p.11). Anti-nuclear campaigners often targeted him because of his lofty, uncompromising views regarding the morality of nuclear weapons and the infallibility of scientists. The British particularly requested Titterton’s presence at the tests. (Milliken 1986, pp. 25, 67-68)

As to the role of the AWTSC they were, (Tame & Robotham 1982, p.114)

1. To examine information and other data supplied by the United Kingdom Government relating to atomic weapons tests proposed to be carried out from time to time in Australia. This examination was to determine whether the safety measures proposed to be taken in relation to such tests were adequate for the prevention of injury to persons or damage to livestock and other property as a result of such tests.

2. To advise the Prime Minister, through the Minister for Supply, of conclusions arrived at by the Committee as a result of such examination, and in particular as to whether, and, if so, what additional, alternative or more extensive safety measures were considered necessary or desirable.

So that the responsibility of the Committee was one of guarding the health and safety of the Australian public both inside and outside the testing areas, including concerns as to the possibility and reality of fallout and its inherent dangers. The AWTSC’s duties also required it to be concerned about “damage to livestock and other property” which of course included damage to the environment. Safety Committee incompetence and indifference are the only reasonable conclusions that can be arrived at concerning the environmental damage that occurred at Maralinga as a result of the minor trials. At no time was it officially suggested that the role of the AWTSC was to conceal dangerous test practices from the Australian public, or even to act as an apologist for British atomic test disasters, but these are the roles it seems to have adopted.

It was the work of Dr Hedley Marston that contradicted AWTSC claims and challenged its credibility. Marston, a respected scientist and a fellow of the Royal society, was the Chief of the Division of Biochemistry and Nutrition of the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research organisation (CSIRO) in Adelaide. Dr Marston’s biological monitoring program discussed previously, was based on the detection of fallout and its intensity by sampling the presence and extent of iodine-131 in thyroid glands of animals grazing in selected areas in central, northern and north-eastern Australia.

The animals consisting of sheep and cattle, had been previously slaughtered for food, their thyroid glands having then been sent to the Adelaide CSIRO laboratories for analysis. In the course of his investigation, Marston was disturbed to read Safety Committee press releases that conflicted with his findings. For example, Marston’s study had found widespread fallout in Western Australia which according to the Safety Committee had not received any fallout from the Monte Bello tests. As he later summed it up in his own words,

“...our thyroid findings (from May/June tests) taken in conjunction with ‘official’ announcements in the press, can only lead to one of two conclusions viz. either monitoring set up in use at present is incapable of doing what it aims to accomplish or someone is lying”. (English & Ionno 1980)

However, it is by re-visiting the Adelaide experience of fallout from the Buffalo test on the night of 11-12 of October 1956, that the conflict that occurred between Marston and the AWTSC, and the committee’s attempt to smear and belittle his results and reputation can best be understood.

In 1958 the fallout on Adelaide in 1956 became common knowledge in the Australian scientific community, when Dr Hedley Marston published a paper in the limited circulation scientific journal, The Journal of Biological Science. Knowledge of Adelaide’s irradiation prior to this publication, was confined to scientists and high-level administrators of the British atomic bomb program including members of the Safety Committee (English & Ionno 1980). It should be stressed however, that although Marston disagreed with AWTSC statements, he never at any stage claimed that the radiation levels detected by him presented a major health hazard to the Australian public (Tame & Robotham 1982, p.119). It should also be stressed though, that what were regarded as safe levels in 1956 have not been seen as safe since the 1980’s.

The Safety Committee’s indignation with Dr Marston over the disparity of his results is reflected in their repossession of counting equipment lent to him for measuring iodine-131 levels (Tame & Robotham 1982, p.119). Disagreement over the place and extent of radioactive fallout was not the only issue that caused friction between Marston and the Test Authority and Safety Committee. For the AWTSC opposed publication of Marston’s figures relating to the types and proportions of isotopes present in thyroids (eg Strontium 90), not only because they assumed them to be based on unreliable research methods, which was not true, but also because they considered that their publication constituted a blatant breach of tests security.

As Chairperson of the National Radiation Advisory Committee, Sir McFarlane Burnet was required to adjudicate and on November 3, 1958 he wrote to Titterton suggesting that the paper should be withdrawn from publication, but at the same time expressing the fear that because of the conflict, (Royal Commission 1985 Vol.2, pp. 436-437)

I am frankly worried by the situation …could be labelled by the press as an attempt by Government to interfere with scientific integrity, or on the other side, as an attempt by left wing scientists to interfere with defence preparation. All concerned are fully aware that neither is the case (Royal Commission 1985 Vol. 2, p. 437).

Dr Hedley Marston was eventually relieved of his duties, which were taken over by the Safety Committee. He died in 1965 (English & Ionno 1980).

But the biggest debacle for the Safety Committee generally, and for Titterton particularly, centred on two matters involving Titterton’s approval of the minor trials which were to cause such extensive environmental damage. Two versions exist of the “two matters’. The first, documented in the Report of the Royal Commission into the British Atomic Tests in Australia, (Royal Commission 1985 vol. 2, pp. 513-514) refers to:

· The first matter being that Titterton had agreed “in principle” to the British holding their minor trials in Australia “though he was ignorant of their details”,

· and the second matter being that Wheeler, a British representative for the atomic tests, had urged his Government to pass additional information on to Titterton exclusively whilst withholding it from other members of the AWTSC.

In the second version of the two matters, Milliken in addressing the two items (1986, pp. 84-85) quotes John Moroney who became secretary to the safety committee as saying,

· “.. Titterton had greater knowledge than anyone in Australia on the major and the minor trials and that was quite generally recognised”.

· Whilst related to the second item Moroney said, “Senior officers and ministers recognised that Professor Titterton was in a privileged position as far as sensitive information is concerned.” Which can be interpreted as meaning that in making decisions, other members of the Safety Committee were forced to rely on Titterton’s superior knowledge.

An interesting tête-à-tête occurred at the Royal Commission hearing between counsel assisting the Royal Commission Peter McClellan, and Professor Titterton regarding the latter’s disclosure of sensitive information to other members of the Safety committee: (Milliken 1986, p. 85)

McClellan: Were you always careful to tell them everything you knew?

Titterton: You are near to being libellous now ..

McClellan: Perhaps I am Sir Ernest, but would you deal with the question that you always disclosed everything you knew to your colleagues on the Safety Committee?

Titterton: Of course not, I was subject to American control on information .. I was subject to the Official Secrets Act ..

However, whichever version is correct Titterton has damned himself. Since he was still being grossly irresponsible and negligent whether he agreed “in principle” to the trials in spite of having little understanding of the potential of the minor trials to cause widespread environmental damage, or if indeed he did know of the potential danger, had still assented.

At the meeting of the AWTSC on February 26, 1959, Titterton explained to the other members that he had formally recommended to the Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies, that the minor trials should go ahead (Royal Commission 1985 vol. 2, pp. 513-514). Noteworthy though is that since minor trials had been performed since 1953, in 1959 Titterton was in fact assenting mostly to the Vixen A and B trials, which were to cause most of the environmental damage.

Perhaps worth mentioning here is a serious allegation involving Prime Minister Menzies and the AWTSC (Tame & Robotham 1982, pp. 226-228), concerning an article, which was being prepared for publication on September 8, 1977 by a Melbourne based monthly magazine “Overland”. The article dealt with the period of the twin crises, the Suez Canal and the Hungarian uprising, and a meeting of the United Nations Security Council scheduled for October 5, 1956, which was intended to resolve the Suez Canal crisis. Believing that her position in the negotiations would be greatly strengthened by demonstrating her recently acquired nuclear capacity, Britain invited Russian and US observers to be present at the first Buffalo test scheduled for September 27, 1956.

However although the predicted winds were in the wrong direction on the night of the test, Menzies, sympathetic to Britain’s needs, is alleged to have overruled the safety committee’s decision to call the test off. Overland’s intended article talked of fallout on Queensland that resulted from the Buffalo test and that Brisbane’s total milk supply was for several days dumped, with alternative milk being obtained from unaffected sources.

Further, on September 8, 1977, two men claiming to work for the Department of Meteorology visited Overland’s offices and asked to borrow the completed article – the only copy in existence, promising to return it in adequate time for its publication. They never returned and the Department of Meteorology denied that two of their representatives had ever visited Overland’s offices. Not surprisingly, those who held the original documentation supporting the article were “unable” to supply it again (Tame & Robotham 1982, pp. 226-228).

The Minor Trials

The so-called “minor trials” were related to weapon design in that their purpose was by experiment, to improve the efficiency, power and safety of nuclear weapons. These trials were accorded the most secret classification of all aspects of the atomic tests, with all Australian scientists apart from Titterton being given little or no information as to their nature (Royal Commission 1985 vol. 2, pp. 513-514). Known prior to October 1958 as “Minor Trials” when they became known as the “Assessment Tests” until December 1959 after which they were referred to as the “Maralinga Experimental Program”. It is suggested that these name changes were imposed by a Government sensitive to the possible outcome of the ongoing Geneva negotiations and their potential to result in an International ban on nuclear testing, and “Maralinga Experimental Program” was probably thought to sound more innocuous (Royal Commission 1985 vol. 2, pp. 395).

Why weren’t these trials held in Britain, where for reasons of distance and accessibility, it would have been more convenient? The answer it would seem lies in the sensitivity of the British Government to British public opinion regarding radioactive contamination, especially after the then recent nuclear disaster at Windscale (now Sellafield) in October 1957, which released radioactivity into the atmosphere and caused widespread radioactive pollution (Royal Commission 1985 vol. 2, p. 402, British Energy | Media | Factfiles). As an interesting and humorous aside to this matter; when counsel assisting the Royal Commission asked why these particular trials were not held in one of the remote parts of Scotland instead of at Emu and Maralinga, a British Atomic Tests official replied “I doubt if people owning estates in Scotland would look on that with very great favour. They are interested in pheasants and deer in Scotland” (Royal Commission 1985 vol. 2, p. 405).

The minor trials consisted of several experimental programs code-named Kittens, Tims, Rats, Vixen A and Vixen B. These experiments were designed to investigate for the purpose of improving, the performance of the component parts of a nuclear device. More specifically they were (Royal Commission 1985 vol. 2, pp. 395-401):

Kittens

Five kittens programs occurred at Emu and a further 94 at Maralinga. They were designed to aid in neutron initiator development, where an initiator enhances the number of neutrons available to promote fission at the instant that the pieces of fissile material of an atomic bomb are explosively driven together to form a super-critical mass. In this way the power of the nuclear explosion is greatly enhanced. The Kitten experiments centred on the use of alpha emitting materials eg polonium which were forced into contact with beryllium by the chemical explosion in the bomb. Prior to that the two materials were separated by a sheet of material thick enough to stop the alpha particles reaching the beryllium. Intense neutron enhancement occurs when the alpha particles are absorbed by the beryllium atoms. The Kitten experiments dispersed polonium-210, beryllium and depleted uranium over the Emu and Maralinga sites. (Royal Commission 1985 vol. 2, p. 396, Symonds 1985, p. 483)

Tims

These were timing experiments related to the compression of fissile bomb material by chemical explosives. The 321 Tims experiments which were carried out dispersed beryllium and uranium-238 (depleted uranium) on the test sites. (Royal Commission 1985 vol. 2, p. 396, Symonds 1985, p. 483)

Rats

These were also timing experiments similar to Tims but applying a different means of measurement. There were 125 Rats experiments which contributed scandium-46, uranium-238 and polonium-210, to site contamination. (Royal Commission 1985 vol. 2, p. 396, Symonds 1985, pp. 483-484)

Vixen A

The Vixen A experiments were designed to study the extent that a nuclear accident can cause radioactive and toxic material contamination which could possibly result from nuclear weapon being subjected to an explosion or fire. These tests caused widespread dispersion of contaminants to the extent that airborne sampling of contamination and existing meteorological conditions using aircraft or balloons was sometimes required. The experiment was based on three variations that were; combustion in a controlled petrol fire, combustion in an electric furnace and dispersion by chemical explosives. There were thirty-one Vixen A experiments between 1959 and 1961 which contaminated the Maralinga site with natural and depleted uranium, plutonium, polonium-210 and actinium-227. (Royal Commission 1985 vol. 2, p. 397)

Vixen B

Called “safety experiments”, the Vixen B trials were intended to investigate the accidental detonation of a nuclear weapon when subjected to a fire or aircraft crash. Because of the precise and complicated timing needed to correctly initiate a chemical explosive trigger of an implosion device to produce a full nuclear explosion, Scientists were interested in knowing how far towards this end a random external explosion would go.

Even a partial nuclear explosion would release significant amounts of fission energy and radioactive material albeit that the fission energy would be less than that produced by the chemical explosive trigger. To facilitate a realistic experiment, the quantity of fissile material used such as uranium-235 or plutonium-239, was sufficient under the appropriate conditions to achieve a slightly super-critical condition for a relatively short period. The inclusion of a powerful neutron source sustained the super-critical phase for a period sufficient for multiplication of the neutron population during the phase to be measured. So that in addition to safety assessments, the experiment was able to contribute information relating to the improvement of the weapon’s design.

The twelve Vixen B trials which took place at Maralinga between the years 1960-1963 dispersed tens of kilograms each of Pu-239, U-235, U-238 and beryllium on the Taranaki site, making Taranaki by far the worst contaminated area at Maralinga (Royal Commission 1985 vol. 2, pp. 397-398, Symonds 1985, p. 484).

Contaminants Dispersed on Test Site by Minor Trials

Almost all the Minor Trials caused site contamination of some sort and whereas the Kitten, Tims and Rats trials produced contaminants of relatively short half-lives it was the Vixen trials, particularly Vixen B that dispersed large quantities of the long half-life pollutants Plutonium, Beryllium and Uranium, each of which will be discussed in more detail. It is these pollutants that have caused the long-term contamination at Maralinga, requiring a clean-up that is still proceeding (Royal Commission 1985 vol. 2, pp. 398-399).

Plutonium

Plutonium is a highly toxic substance. An alpha-emitter with a half-life of 24,000 years, which if inhaled, injected or ingested can cause cancer, plutonium is a highly toxic substance. Because when within living matter, alpha particles, akin to large cannon balls by comparison with other forms of radiation, can cause enormous and continuous tissue damage wherever their emitter resides, which over a period of time can result in serious genetic damage (author’s own knowledge as physicist). Within the human body alpha radiation is the most dangerous

Table 6.1

Plutonium Dispersed at Various Minor Trials Sites

Location Trial Date Quantity of Plutonium

Taranaki Vixen B 1960-1963 22.2 Kg

Naya 1 (TM100) Tims 1960 0.6 Kg

Naya (TM101) Tims 1961 0.6 Kg

Wewak (VK 33) Vixen A 1959 0.008 Kg

Wewak (VK60A) Vixen A 1961 0.294 Kg

Wewak (VK60C) Vixen A 1961 0.277 Kg

Table 6.2

Beryllium Dispersed at Various Minor Trials Sites

Location Trial Date Quantity of Beryllium

Emu Kittens 1953 0.036 Kg

Naya Kittens 1955-57 0.75 Kg

Naya Tims 1957 1.60 Kg

Kuli - TM11 Tims 1959-60 26.20 Kg

- TM16 Tims 1960-61 39.00 Kg

- TM5 Tims 1961 10.00 Kg

Wewak – VK29 Vixen A 1959 0.140 Kg

– VK28 Vixen A 1959 0.250 Kg

– VK27 Vixen A 1959 0.230 Kg

– VK30 Vixen A 1959 0.100 Kg

– VK60A Vixen A 1961 1.720 Kg

– VK60B Vixen A 1961 1.720 Kg

Taranaki Vixen B 1961-63 17.600 Kg

Total 101.200 Kg

(Royal Commission 1985 vol. 2, p. 400)

form of radiation. The above table (Table 6.1) taken from page 399 of volume 2 of the Royal Commission Report shows the disposition and quantity of plutonium various Maralinga sites, and shows the contributions of the various minor trials to the pollution.

Beryllium

Beryllium is a toxic material and of the estimated 101 Kilograms used during the Minor Trials, 99 Kilograms was known to have been dispersed on the various test sites, with only 1.8 Kilograms being recovered. Some of the remainder however would have been mixed with contaminated soil, which was buried in the Taranaki pits. Table 6.2 above shows the initial beryllium dispersion and on which sites. (Royal Commission 1985 vol. 2, p. 400)

Uranium

Most of the eight tons of depleted uranium used for the minor trials was used in the Tims trials. Table 6.3 below shows the place and quantity dispersed (Royal Commission 1985 vol. 2, p. 400).

Table 6.3

Depleted Uranium Dispersed at Various Minor Trials Sites

Location Trial Date Uranium-235 Uranium-238

Naya 3 Tims 1955 138.0 Kg

Kuli – TM4 Tims 1956-60 6605.0 Kg

– TM11 Tims 1959-60 67.0 Kg

– TM16 Tims 1960-63 731.0 Kg

– TM50 Tims 1961 90.0 Kg

Kittens Area Kittens 1955-57 120.0 Kg

Naya 1 Rats 1956-58 151.0 Kg

Naya Kittens 1957 5.0 Kg

Naya 2 Kittens 1960-62 32.0 Kg

Naya 3 Kittens 1957 23.4 Kg

Wewak Vixen A 67.8 Kg

Dobo Rats 28.0 Kg

Taranaki Vixen B 22.4 Kg 24.9 Kg

Total 22.4 Kg 8083.0 Kg (Royal Commission 1985 vol. 2, p. 401)

During clean-up operation Brumby that succeeded the tests, approximately 830 tons of contaminated material including 20 Kilograms of plutonium, were buried in 21 pits and an estimated 2 Kilograms distributed over the test site at Taranaki. It is not known how much of the plutonium from other sites was dispersed since some was attached to soil that was transported to Taranaki and subsequently buried in the pits there. (Royal Commission 1985 vol. 2, p. 399) Operation Brumby, which followed the completion of the atomic tests, will be discussed in more detail in chapter 10.

Conclusion

It was thought desirable that the reader be acquainted with the theory of nuclear weapons so as to be able to understand what the nuclear tests discussed later in the chapter were intended to achieve. Also mentioned was the mechanism of fallout since this was considered relevant to understanding the issue of the Black Mist. It was also essential that the reader is familiar with the various tests held and their purposes.

The Black Mist incident mentioned in this chapter and discussed in more detail later, is of great importance to the purpose of this thesis, since it relates to fallout injuring local inhabitants, most of whom were Aborigines. Two important points arise from this incident. First, of those engulfed by the mist it was the Aborigines, by virtue of living in the open without shelter, who were the most vulnerable. For this reason it is argued that particular care should have been taken by the Tests Authority to avoid fallout on lands where Aborigines were living.

Second, when faced with accusations of the Black Mist fallout the Tests Authority strongly denied the possibility until faced with the overwhelming evidence of its existence. This one incident proves more than any other that the Tests Authority was indifferent to the health and welfare of local Aborigines in that it did not take sufficient care to avoid fallout on Aboriginal areas, and strongly denied it when caught out!

The first evidence that the Black Mist could have occurred came from a computer study by two British scientists, which helped refute the denials of ex members of the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee, (AWTSC). As previously mentioned, this is important to this thesis since it helps to confirm the belief that the Tests Authority was indifferent to the safety of welfare of local inhabitants – in this case members of the Aboriginal community. Further incidents of fallout were again denied by the AWTSC but positively substantiated by Dr Hedley Marston using reliable biological monitoring.

The fallout issue raises serious questions. How and why was it possible that extensive fallout occurred which in Marston’s words was ‘a band of terrain about 1,000 miles wide stretching West to East across the continent’ and ‘Some of the areas most heavily contaminated with fallout from plumes 1,500 to 2,000 miles away [from the test area]’? Was the AWTSC negligent or were the British emulating proven American practices in using local populations as nuclear test subjects?

The Black Mist incident was only one of several incidents of fallout going where it was not expected to - the fallout on Adelaide on the night of 11-12 October, 1956 was another. In this case, there is no consolation that Australian Bureau of Statistics figures taken in 1974 indicated that there was no increase in the incidence of cancer between 1945-1949 and 1970-1974, because at the latter period when cancers could be expected to be occurring, Adelaide’s original 1956 population had been diluted by a large influx of young migrants which had occurred since that time.

In general, it is quite unrealistic for AWTSC members to argue that the radioactivity resulting from the fallout was so small as to have had a negligible effect on health in cases of fallout on inhabited areas resulting from the tests, (see bottom p. 78) since conclusions drawn from the dosage threshold debate in chapter 5 was that all radiation has the propensity to cause harm. Nor was the AWTSC always in charge for on the night of the first Buffalo test on September 27, 1956 when it called the test off because of unfavourable winds, Australian Prime Minister Menzies overruled the AWTSC and allowed the test to proceed resulting in fallout on Queensland extending as far as Brisbane.

The approval to hold the Minor Trials in Australia, is a further debacle, again perhaps due to AWTSC ineptitude, since they allowed Titterton to deceive them into believing that the Minor Trials lacked the potential to do environmental harm. These trials were to do lasting damage at Maralinga, involving a clean-up which even now has not been satisfactorily completed. For as the chapter shows, among the site contaminants are large quantities of plutonium and depleted uranium (23 Kgs and eight tons respectively) where both materials are highly dangerous cancer causing alpha-emitters that until eradicated, are an on-going threat to the health of Maralinga’s traditional inhabitants, the Tjarutja Aborigines.

Arguably, whether the members of the Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee (AWTSC) were acting solely in Britain’s interests or were simply inept, the results of their decisions were the same - detrimental to the interests all Australians, particularly the Aborigines.