The Development of the Atomic bomb

Physicists had known for many years that atoms, the building blocks of matter, were capable of yielding enormous amounts of energy if only the key to unlocking the energy could be found. During the decade of 1930 to 1939, two important discoveries occurred which made the energy of the atom accessible. The first was the discovery of the neutron by the British scientist James Chadwick (Millikin 1986, pp. 4-8). The second of equal importance, was the discovery in 1938 of nuclear fission by the Germans, Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann (Millikin 1986, pp. 4-8). They found that bombarding the isotope uranium 235 with neutrons caused the atoms to disintegrate releasing large quantities of energy. The key to unlocking the energy of the atom had been found. The same experimental technique showed the common uranium isotope, uranium 238, to be non-fissile.

Post War Influences

At the war’s end in the euphoria that followed, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were generally seen as justifiable acts of war, particularly since it was ‘widely believed that the bombings had saved 500,000 American lives’ (Sunday Program Cover Story (video recording) 1995) which would have been the cost had the invasion of Japan been necessary. Very little thought was given to the effects of the bombs on the largely civilian populations of the two cities and the US Government was at pains to play down the terrible suffering of the survivors, including by the confiscation of Japanese photographs of victims (Sunday Program Cover Story (video recording) 1995), lest they be published in America.

General Groves (Jungk 1956, p. 207) who was the Military Head of the Manhattan Project, testified at a congressional hearing that death from radiation was “very pleasant”. However Americans were faced with another perspective of the atomic bombings when the entire edition of the New Yorker magazine of August 1946 was devoted to a disquieting report (Sunday Program Cover Story (video recording) 1995) of the atomic attacks. The report entitled simply “Hiroshima” told of the 75,000 killed instantly and that the eventual count would be trebled by deaths due to radiation and other effects. The article aroused American public opinion and helped strengthen world opposition to nuclear weapons.

But it was the communist domination of Eastern Europe of 1946-1948, the Truman doctrine of 1947, the Soviet initiated Berlin blockade in 1948, the trial of the Rosenbergs for nuclear espionage in 1951, the communist victory in China and the Korean war in 1950-1953 which profoundly influenced Western defence thinking and brought pressure on western nations to accept the role of nuclear weapons as the mainstay of their joint defence against the perceived communist threat. Further, it was the unfortunate period of McCarthyism, named after US Senator Joe McCarthy (Orshinsky 1983), who had acquired political power by ruthlessly exploiting his obsessive belief of communist infiltration in the American government, that compounded growing public anti-communist sentiments, with the belief that only a nuclear armed western alliance could contain the Soviet Union.

Sentiments of this nature had already led to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) of twelve nations including the US, Canada and Britain, in 1949. Importantly, these events occurring in the late 1940s and early 1950s as they did, influenced both the British public and British defence planners to accept that Britain needed nuclear weapons, not only for her own protection, but as a need consistent with her role as a NATO member. Noteworthy though, is that although nuclear weapons have a potential to kill vast numbers of non-combatants, they were generally accepted as legitimate weapons of defence because the concept of total war, including the strategic bombing of civilians, had become an accepted principle during the Second World War.

Britain’s affair with the atomic bomb (Cooper 1998, pp. 2-3) had its origins in 1941 during the desperate days of World War 2, shortly after Frisch and Peierls published their findings on nuclear fission. Atomic weapons were perceived as a means of defeating Germany, but when the demands of fighting a war and the lack of materials and human resources impeded British nuclear research and development, they turned to Canada and the US for assistance. Nevertheless Britain was persuaded to cooperate in a joint project of atomic weapon development with the US, and in 1942, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed on the participation (Jungk 1956, p. 110) of their respective countries on what was to become the Manhattan Project.

A year after the war’s end in August 1946, in a mood of increasing suspicion, nationalism and egoism, the US Congress passed the McMahon Act forbidding the communication of classified nuclear research information to foreign powers (Millikin 1986, p.15), including Britain and Canada. Although the McMahon Act could not actually impede Britain from developing her own nuclear weapons, it starved her of technological support which British scientists’ contributions to the Manhattan Project would have entitled her.

Britain’s decision to develop her own nuclear weapons was based not only on the perceived military threat stemming from Soviet belligerence, but also from the belief of many in the British Government that the McMahon Act provided her with an opportunity to display her technological superiority independent of US help and interference. There was also a real conviction that atomic weapons would help offset Britain’s numerically inferior military strength (Cooper 1998, p. 2-3).

Perhaps the most important reason for the decision was to counter Britain’s growing feelings of inferiority due to her declining status as a world power, and to fortify her determination not to be bullied by the US into accepting an American nuclear monopoly. Lord Cherwell, scientific adviser to the British Government, confirmed this belief in 1949 when he said:

Then followed a great deal of consideration as to whether Britain should develop her own atomic bomb and if so where to hold the tests (Cooper 1998, p. 4). Because of their established infrastructures, the US test sites of Nevada and Eniwetok were given the first preference. These were ruled out however, because of American demands that Britain’s use of American test sites would require her to make all results available to the US atomic energy authorities - a one-way transmission since no American test information would be reciprocated.

Seven sites in Canada were discarded for other reasons. Accordingly, Britain turned to Australia, now a nation but once comprised of several British colonies, which had all the defined attributes of an ideal atomic test site, ie possessing a suitable infrastructure with isolated, ‘uninhabited’ land suitable for testing. It will be argued later in this thesis, that Britain also chose Australia in the expectation that by virtue of past colonial ties and a common sovereign and heritage, Australians would be very sympathetic and submissive to Britain’s atomic test demands.

Australia’s Defence and Weapons Philosophy 1945 -1951

The threat of a Japanese invasion of Australia during World War Two had been an unnerving experience for Australian defence planners, politicians and the general population alike, and after the war’s end they continued to fear a threat of invasion posed by the large Asian populations to Australia’s north. This national paranoia expressed itself in what was seen as a need for an accelerated migration program and deep concerns for Australia’s future defence capacity.

Preceding the end of World War Two there had developed in government circles in Britain a belief that that there should be defence science collaboration between the nations of the British Empire. These thoughts were echoed by leading British defence scientist Henry Tizard in a conversation with the Canadian Prime Minister McKenzie King when he said “[the] main thing to settle now, so far as science is concerned, is the method of collaboration between the scattered British races” (Reynolds 1999, p. 58, quoted in Tizard 1944).

This proposed defence option received a boost in 1946 when the US Government that opposed the possibility of Britain sharing her atomic information with her dominions, enacted the McMahon Act. Thus America in protecting her atomic interests, obliged Britain to capitalise on the resources of her empire - resources which provided raw materials including uranium and thorium, scientific manpower for research and development and in Australia vast areas of open desert suitable for weapons testing.

Speaking after the conference, Ben Chifley the Australian Prime Minister enthusiastically endorsed atomic energy as having “far reaching effects on our plans in cooperation for Empire defence” (Reynolds 1999, p. 59). He pledged to fulfil Australia’s Commonwealth obligations by installing an Australian atomic program, which would provide for development of Australia’s uranium resources, train her nuclear scientists and engineers and build atomic piles for plutonium production. Following decisions which were made at the conference to build deterrent weapons, an Anglo-Australian project to develop South Australia’s far north into a rocket testing area, to be known as the Woomera Rocket Range, was commenced in 1946.

Chifley’s enthusiasm extended to wanting no less than an effective voice at the highest levels of British Empire defence planning, as it was envisaged that nuclear weapons would have to have been developed and in production by the mid-fifties, so as to be available for the expected war with the Soviet Union in 1956-1957. In June 1947 the Chifley Government enacted the Approved Defence Projects Act, intended to improve the system of cooperation between Britain and Australia in the development and production of nuclear weapons (Reynolds 1999, p. 60).

Australia’s Ongoing Commitment to Obtain Nuclear Weapons

It is important to realise that national philosophies relating to nuclear weapons during the 1950s, Australian attitudes included, were that these weapons would proliferate the world’s armaments and that America’s exclusive possession was only temporary. Indeed it was generally recognised that most of the world’s industrially developed countries, the UK, France and Japan included, had the capacity and scientific expertise to produce nuclear weapons given sufficient time and resources allocation (Walsh 1999, p. 2).

Despite a refusal Australia persisted and several unsuccessful meetings with British officials ensued, including face-to-face encounters between Menzies and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. A further impetus was offered to the British Government by the Menzies Government in the form of proposed purchases of British manufactured aircraft that were to become the delivery systems for the nuclear weapons that Menzies felt sure that Britain would eventually supply.

In January 1958, a report had been submitted to Australian defence chiefs concerning the availability and suitability of  British manufactured V Bombers - the Victor, Valiant and Vulcan and it was these aircraft about which Menzies interest was expressed. Later Australia’s interest switched to the British TSR-2 then under development, but Australia eventually purchased the American F-111, which also had a nuclear weapon carrying capability.

However by the time of its delivery Australia’s hopes of obtaining nuclear weapons had been dissipated. (Reynolds n.d. pp. 12-13) The foregoing demonstrates the great and persistent desire of Australian Governments to acquire tactical nuclear weapons, and that in permitting the British atomic tests to be held here, arguably irrespective of possible damage to people and environment, the Menzies Government hoped to receive nuclear information from a grateful British Government. When this failed Menzies resorted to attempting to purchase the ready-made product.

Britain’s Atomic Weapons Tests Phase

On March 26, 1951 the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee wrote a personal letter to the Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies formally requesting that Australian sovereign territory be made available for the British atomic tests, beginning initially at the Monte Bello Islands in the Indian Ocean. From the British point of view Menzies’ response was unexpectedly warm and generous, for without even consulting his own cabinet Menzies assented to the use of Australian territory for the tests with the addition of a promise of Australian human and material support (Cooper 1998, p. 5). However Menzies was severely castigated in the Report of the Royal Commission into the British Atomic Tests (1985, p. 12), which stated:

The presence of British nuclear test teams in Australia was perceived by the Menzies Government as not only strengthening the nuclear relationship and possibly providing Australia with nuclear know-how, but as a way of promoting Australian modernisation and development. At that early stage the Australian Government had complete optimism for the future of the nation’s defence cooperation with Britain as a part of British Empire Defence Cooperation. Australia was thought to be on the verge of getting nuclear power and it was said in reference to the coal miners’ strike of 1949 that nuclear power reactors would make coal redundant.

Great enthusiasm was shown for using atomic bombs for peaceful purposes eg deepening and creating Australian harbours (Green 1997, pp. 9-10). One project suggested at the time was the creation of underground water storage by exploding a nuclear weapon deep underground and storing water in the cavity created by the explosion. As a part of the test series to be held at Monte Bello, the Menzies government requested an underwater test simulating a ship-borne atomic explosion in a harbour - of particular concern since Australia has several major port-based cities. The Hurricane test in October 1952 acceded to this request (British Nuclear Testing 1997, p. 2).

The Navy provided air support, surveillance and liaison. Australian naval diving services were also provided. Australian ships were present during the tests as observation platforms, whist the Army provided accommodation and messing facilities, transport and communications and the staff to run them. Army engineers built roads, airstrips, buildings, toilets and drains.

The Army was, in conjunction with the federal Police, responsible for site security. The RAAF were used subsequent to the test for air sampling of radioactive clouds. In addition, the Air force provided air transport of personnel and fresh supplies between Monte Bello and the mainland, security patrols over the Monte Bello area and coastal monitoring for radioactive fallout up to four days after a test (Symonds 1985, pp. 75-79).

Whatever their duties, all service personnel were required to observe the tests as part of their nuclear assimilation for participation in future nuclear wars. Most were required to stand with their backs to the detonation for approximately one minute and when there was no longer any danger to eyesight, to turn around and observe the cloud (Perry 1997, p. 1 and Brown 1997, p. 1).

In conjunction with the British atomic tests and as part of Australia’s commitment to Empire defence, the Long Range Weapons Establishment (LWRE) (Reynolds n.d. pp. 7-8) was installed at Salisbury in South Australia on the site of Australia’s largest wartime munitions factory. The establishment offered facilities to British missile contractors that supported their Woomera missile test activities, providing telemetry data reduction, computing via the locally built WREDAC computer and rocket fuel production to name but a small number of the services provided.

During the period air-to-air, ground-to-air, air-to-ground and ground-to-ground testing missile data were processed for the British Government, of which Blue Jay (air-to-air), Rapier and Bloodhound (ground-to-air), Blue Steel (air-to-ground), and Blue Streak the intended intercontinental nuclear weapon delivery system, are prominent examples. Nearby at Edinburgh military airfield, atomic bombs were assembled prior to testing at one of the testing sites of Monte Bello, Maralinga or Emu. In 1952, the Australian Government provided funds for an infrastructure at the Rum Jungle (Uranium Information Centre 1999) uranium mine in the Northern Territory. The mine which finally closed in 1971 until 1962, provided uranium oxide to an UK-US joint interest through the auspices of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC).

The Demise of  British-Australian Defence Cooperation

In the late 1950s, Australia as a major player in Empire defence, could look to the future with optimism. There was confidence that she would eventually possess atomic weapons for her defence and purchase of the British Blue Streak continental missile was already being considered by Australian defence planners as a means of their delivery (Reynolds n.d. p. 8). However the historical meeting between British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and American President Dwight Eisenhower in March 1957, the so-called Bermuda conference, effectively and dramatically ended the Empire defence cooperation program.

Concerned at Soviet advances in nuclear weapons and space technology, the American Congress approved amendments to the 1954 Atomic Energy Act which provided for exchange of nuclear weapons information with friendly powers that had achieved a substantial level of progress in the nuclear weapons field. Following Britain’s successful development of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, she was accordingly granted a privileged position in the joint exchange of nuclear information with America and the purchase of US missile systems, and thus now that costly Empire defence arrangement was no longer essential to Britain’s defence, she took the opportunity to end it. The Blue Streak project was cancelled since as an American ally, Britain had access to the ready supply of American intercontinental missiles (Milliken 1986, pp. 236-237).

The basic fact is that we stand or fall together, and that Great Britain will no more need to worry about Australian cooperation in the future than she has in the past. The longer I engage in public affairs the more convinced I am that we must at all times nourish our ancient structural unity which remains the best thing in the free world (Millikin 1986, p. 55).

Conclusion


This chapter was first intended to acquaint the reader with the early pre-war developments in physics, especially those with which Britain played a role. It has considered the forces in the post-war period that influenced Britain to develop her own nuclear weapons from the aspects of cold-war influences such as Soviet Union expansionism and the fear and paranoia emanating from the United States eg McCarthyism. Likewise mentioned, was the McMahon Act that curtailed the privileged position of Britain’s sharing of top secret nuclear information with the US, enjoyed by her until then. These events are important since they provide some insight as to why Britain chose to develop her own atomic weapons and more importantly, why she eventually turned to Australia for support.

Of the Australian perspective, the little known desire of the Australian Government and defence hierarchies to possess tactical nuclear weapons was one further step towards Britain holding her tests on the Australian mainland. This arose since of her leaders, Chifley expected a share of British nuclear technology as quid pro quo for Australia’s contribution to British Empire defence, and Menzies felt assured of purchasing tactical nuclear weapons and the means of their deployment from the UK, in return for Australia’s part in Empire defence, and for nuclear testing being held in Australia.

Australia’s motivation in desiring nuclear weapons centred on two main reasons - her perceived vulnerability in Asia given the experience of the military threat posed by Japan during World War 2, and prestige - it was felt that becoming a nuclear power would bring her greater respect and status, particularly as a member of ANZUS and SEATO. 

However the most important issue arising in this chapter is that Britain took advantage of her latent colonial powers, and the support of many pro-British Australians (eg Menzies), to persuade Australia to contribute to the Empire defence and to ultimately to hold the nuclear tests in Australia. Worse it is argued that by renewing the British-United States defence alliance, Britain betrayed and abandoned Australia after the tests had been successfully completed and Australia was of no further use to her.

Australia’s contribution to the Empire defence agreement and the nuclear tests had been considerable involving infrastructure at Salisbury and Woomera in South Australia, the construction of the Lucas Heights reactor under the requirements of the defence agreement, and manpower and infrastructure support for the tests. Also to be considered was the extensive environmental damage of atomic test sites in Australia, which initially Britain refused to acknowledge, claiming that all pollution had been effectively cleaned up prior to her departure.

The next chapter will discuss the ill-treatment of Aborigines since the white settlement of Australia in order to emphasise that their treatment during the British tests was both consistent with and justified by past white behaviour. The chapter will also look at the nuclear test performances in human rights and environmental damage of three other nuclear powers, by way of showing a similarity and consistency with that of Britain.